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SIXTH AMENDMENT-MASSLAH REVITALIZED
United States v. Henry, 100 S. Ct. 2183 (1980).
During the past term, the United States Su-
preme Court established a new test to determine
whether government activity has violated an in-
dicted defendant's sixth amendment right to the
assistance of counsel.' In United States v. Henry,2 the
Court held that by having the defendant's cellmate
act as a paid, undisclosed informant while the'
defendant was in custody and under indictment,
the government intentionally created a situation
"likely to induce" 3 the defendant to make incrim-
inating statements without the assistance of counsel
in violation of his rights under Massiah v. United
States.4
With the formulation of this new test, the Court
clarified the degree of governmental interference
necessary to invoke the right to counsel, indicating
that a lesser degree of wrongful governmental con-
duct was necessary to invoke the right than was
required under the Court's previous interpretations
of Massiah. In addition, the Court's application of
this new test seemed to indicate that it would be
more willing to find a violation of a defendant's
sixth amendment rights under the Henry test than
it would be to find a violation of fifth amendment
protections utilizing a similar test.
I. BACKGROUND
Defendant Henry was arrested and indicted by
a federal grand jury for the armed robbery of a
Virginia bank and was held pending trial in the
Norfolk City Jail. Shortly after Henry was incar-
cerated, federal agents contacted Edward Nichols,
an inmate housed in Henry's cellblock. For some
time prior to this contact, the Federal Bureau of
Investigation had employed Nichols as a paid in-
formant. The agent told Nichols to pay attention
to any statements made by Henry or other federal
I "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right ... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his
defence." U.S. CoNs'r. amend. VI.
2 100 S. Ct. 2183 (1980).
3 Id. at 2189.
4 377 U.S. 201 (1964). In Massiah, the Court held that
the admission of the defendant's incriminating state-
ments, which federal agents had deliberately elicited from
him in the absence of his counsel after he had been
indicted, violated the defendant's sixth amendment
rights.
prisoners in the cellblock, but not to initiate con-
versation with Henry or question him regarding
the bank robbery.5 Several weeks later, after Ni-
chols had been released, he reported that he had
had "'an opportunity to have some conversations
with Mr. Henry while he was in the jail' ,6 and
that Henry had made incriminating statements to
Nichols.
Nichols' testimony as to Henry's incriminating
statements was admitted at Henry's trial,7 and he
was subsequently convicted of bank robbery and
sentenced to twenty-five years in prison. He ap-
pealed, raising no sixth amendment claims, and
the Fourth Circuit affirmed his conviction.8 The
Supreme Court denied certiorari.9
Henry then moved to vacate his sentence pur-
suant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255,' ° contending that the
admission of Nichols' testimony violated his sixth
amendment right to the assistance of counsel. He
alleged that he had been intentionally placed in
the same cell with Nichols so that Nichols could
obtain information about the robbery. The district
court denied the motion without a hearing. The
court of appeals, however, reversed and remanded
for an evidentiary inquiry into whether Nichols
was acting as a government agent when he con-
versed with Henry.
1'
5 100 S. Ct. 2184.
6 Whether Nichols or Henry instigated these conver-
sations is unclear. However, in an affidavit submitted by
the F.B.I. agent who contacted Nichols, the agent stated,
"I recall telling Nichols not to initiate any conversations
with Henry.... " l at 2186.
7 Nichols testified at trial that Henry had told Nichols
that he had on several occasions gone to the bank to see
which employees opened the vault. He also testified that
Henry had described the details of the robbery to him.
Id. at 2185.
8483 F.2d 1401 (4th Cir. 1973).
9421 U.S. 915 (1975).
10 That section provides in relevant part:
A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court
established by Act of Congress claiming the right to
be released upon the ground that the sentence was
imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of
the United States ... may move the court which
imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct
the sentence.
28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1976).
1 Henry v. United States, 551 F.2d 306 (4th Cir. 1977).
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Following the evidentiary inquiry, the district
court again denied Henry's motion. The Fourth
Circuit again reversed and remanded, 12 however,
finding that the undisclosed government monitor-
ing of Henry while he was in custody and under
indictment violated his sixth amendment right to
the assistance of counsel under Massiah.13
The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Chief
Justice Burger, affirmed. The Henry majority also
relied heavily on Massiah where the Court held the
admission of a defendant's incriminating state-
ments, which federal agents had "deliberately elic-
ited" from him after indictment and in the absence
of his counsel, violated the defendant's sixth
amendment right to counsel.' 4 In finding that the
government "deliberately elicited" incriminating
statements from Henry within the meaning of Mas-
siah, the Court emphasized three specific factors.
"First, Nichols was acting under instructions as a
paid informant for the government; second, Ni-
chols ostensibly was no more than a fellow inmate
of Henry's; and third, Henry was in custody and
under indictment at the time he was engaged in
conversation by Nichols. 'is From these three fac-
tors, the Court concluded that the government
intentionally created a situation "likely to
induce ' ' 1i Henry to make incriminating statements
in the absence of counsel, and that as a consequence
the government had violated the prohibition of
Massiah.
Since the government was to pay Nichols for
producing information, the Court seemed to con-
clude that this would lead to more vigorous at-
tempts by Nichols to obtain statements from
12 590 F.2d 544 (4th Cir. 1978).
13 Id. at 547 (citing Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S.
201). In Massiah, the petitioner had been indicted for
possession of narcotics when he was released on bail.
Subsequently, and unknown to Massiah, a codefendant,
Colson, decided to cooperate with the government in its
continuing investigation into the illegal narcotics activi-
ties with which Massiah and Colson had been charged.
Colson allowed a federal agent to install a radio trans-
mitter in Colson's car, enabling the agent to overhear
conversations carried on in the vehicle. Colson then
proceeded to converse with Massiah while seated in the
parked car. During this conversation, Massiah made
several incriminating statements. The agent, parked in a
car down the street, overheard the entire conversation
and testified as to Massiah's incriminating statements at
the trial. Curiously, the Court did not discuss what
Colson said or how he said it during the course of this
conversation. Evidently, the Court considered Colson's
conduct to be irrelevant.
14 377 U.S. at 206.
'5 100 S. Ct. at 2186.
16Id. at 2189.
Henry.17 It stated that "[e]ven if the agent's state-
ment is accepted that he did not intend that Ni-
chols would take affirmative steps to secure incrim-
inating information, he must have known that such
propinquity likely would lead to that result." 18
In considering the effect of Nichols' undercover
status, the Court considered the government's po-
sition that a more lenient sixth amendment stan-
dard should be applied when the accused has made
incriminating statements to an undisclosed inform-
ant than when the accused has spoken in the
presence of known government officers. The Court
implied that the rationale for this argument was
that the accused is under less inherent pressure to
incriminate himself when he thinks he is speaking,
not to an agent of the government, but to a fellow
prisoner.' 9
Rejecting the government's argument, ChiefJus-
tice Burger pointed out that when speaking to an
undercover informant, the accused may be more
likely to disclose information that he would not
intentionally reveal to a known government
agent.20 As the Chief Justice further noted, the
Massiah Court had itself pointed out that Massiah
was "more seriously imposed upon because he did
not even know that he was under interrogation by
a government agent."' 21 In discussing Henry's cus-
tody at the time he made his incriminating state-
ments to Nichols, the Court utilized the rationale
of Miranda v. Arizona.22 In Miranda, the Court held
that the statements of an accused which stem from
his custodial interrogation will not be admissible
against him unless the prosecution can demonstrate
the use of procedural safeguards to protect the
accused's privilege against self-incrimination.2 As
17 The majority stated that Nichols was to be paid on
a contingent fee basis; therefore he would be compensated
only if he produced useful information. Id. at 2187.
However, Justice Blackmun disagreed that such an ar-
rangement existed. Id. at 2193 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
18 Id. at 2187. As the quote indicates, the majority took
the position that Nichols somehow deliberately used his
position to secure incriminating information from Henry.
Nowhere in the opinion, however, does the Court indicate
exactly what conduct Nichols engaged in in order to do
SO.
9 100 S. Ct. at 2188.
2 id.
21 Id. (citing Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. at
207).
22 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
2 These procedural safeguards are embodied in the
now famous Miranda wamings: "Prior to any questioning,
the person must be warned that he has a right to remain
silent, that any statement he does make may be used as
evidence against him, and that he has a right to the
[Vol. 71
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the Court recognized in Miranda, the very atmos-
phere associated with custodial interrogation is
likely to compel the accused to speak.24
Thus, the Henry Court noted that "the mere fact
of custody imposes pressures on the accused; con-
finement may bring into play subtle influences that
will make him particularly susceptible to the ploys
of undercover government agents."' ss The Court
specifically stated, however, that it did not intend
to make custody a prerequisite to the applicability
of the right to counsel under Massiah; rather, the
fact of Henry's custody constituted a factor in
determining whether the government had engaged
in the "deliberate elicitation" of his incriminating
statements. 26
Finally, the Court held that waiver of the right
to counsel by Henry did not constitute an issue for
resolution, since he could not knowingly and vol-
untarily have waived his rights when speaking to
an individual whom he did not know to be an
agent of the government.
Justice Powell filed a concurring opinion to clar-
ify his position in light of the particular facts of
Henry. He viewed as crucial to the decision the
majority's finding that Nichols had "deliberately
used his position to secure incriminating informa-
tion from Henry."'28 In his view, "the mere presence
of a jailhouse informant who had been instructed
to overhear conversations and to engage a criminal
defendant in some conversations would not neces-
sarily be unconstitutional." 29 Powell also noted
that the case was made difficult by the lack of an
evidentiary hearing on the Massiah claim. How-
ever, it is clear that he felt the finding that Henry's
incriminating statements were not wholly sponta-
neous was essential to the Court's holding.30
presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed."
Id. at 444.
24 "An individual swept from familiar surroundings
into police custody, surrounded by antagonistic forces,
and subjected to the techniques of persuasion described
above cannot be otherwise than under compulsion to
speak." IL at 461.
25 100 S. Ct. at 2188.26 Id. at 2188 n. 1.
27 Id at 2188. This issue was not discussed at length by
the Court, nor was it treated at all by the lower court,
since the point was not disputed. The Fourth Circuit
noted in its opinion that the government did not contend
that Henry had waived his right to counsel at the time of
his conversations with Nichols. 590 F.2d at 545 n.1.
28 100 S. Ct. at 2187.
2 Id. at 2190 (Powell, J., concurring).
"0 "I could not join the Court's opinion if it held that
the mere presence or incidental conversation of an in-
formant in a jail cell would violate Massiah." Id.
Justices Blackmun and Rehnquist filed dissent-
ing opinions in Henry. Justice Blackmun, with
whom Justice White joined, argued that not only
did the majority engage in an undue expansion of
Massiah with its "likely to induce" test, but that it
had also misapplied the new test.31 Justice Black-
mun contended that the Massiah rule covers "only
action undertaken with the specific intent to evoke
an inculpatory disclosure."32 Thus, he reasoned
that since the federal agent who had contacted
Nichols had specifically instructed him not to ini-
tiate conversations with or question Henry about
the robbery, this requisite intent was absent.Justice
Blackmun regarded the majority's test as an expan-
sion of sixth amendment rights, which also resulted
in broadening of the exclusionary rule to encom-
pass a violation of those rights. Justice Blackmun
stressed the lack of congruence of the facts of Henry
with the goals sought to be furthered by the exclu-
sionary rule. In this regard, he noted that Henry's
statements were unquestionably voluntary, that
the condemned police conduct was not what he
would regard as culpable, and that the govern-
ment's actions did not violate any "canons of fair-
ness."
'3
Finally, Justice Blackmun argued that the ma-
jority had misapplied its own test to the facts of
the case. He interpreted the majority's test to be a
two-pronged one, requiring not only a showing
that the government created a situation "likely to
induce" the defendant to make incriminating state-
ments, but also that the informant in fact had
"prompted" the defendant.3a Justice Blackmun ar-
gued that the facts of Henry satisfied neither prong
of this test.
Justice Rehnquist also disagreed with the major-
ity's interpretation of the facts of the case. How-
ever, he devoted most of his opinion to an argument
that Massiah itself should be completely reevalu-
ated.3 5 In his view, the sixth amendment's guar-
antee of the right to counsel requires the presence
of counsel only if the event is one that "requires
knowledge of legal procedure, involves a commu-
nication between the accused and his attorney
concerning investigation of th& case or the prepa-
ration of a defense, or otherwise interferes with the
attorney-client relationship." 36 Justice Rehnquist
also noted that the policies underlying the exclu-
31 Id. at 2193 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
32 Id. at 2191 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
s Id. at 2192.
Id. at 2193.
's Id. at 2197 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
36Id. at 2199 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
19801
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sionary rule did not justify the result reached in
Henry.
3 7
II. THE NEw OBJECTIVE STANDARD
The significance of Henry regarding the sixth
amendment right to counsel lies in the new stan-
dard which it promulgates to determine whether
certain governmental activity violated an indicted
defendant's right to counsel. In Massiah, the Court
first prohibited the government from introducing
at trial incriminating statements deliberately elic-
ited from an indicted defendant in the absence of
counsel.ss Although the Massiah Court did not
explicitly indicate whether the test of elicitation
was objective or subjective, the Court's "deliber-
ately elicited" language implies that the subjective
intent of the government agent constituted a rele-
vant factor. In contrast, the Henry Court's formu-
lation of the "deliberately elicited" test constitutes
an objective, rather then a subjective standard.
Thus, the test focuses not on the government's
subjective intent in engaging in a particular activ-
ity, but rather on an objective evaluation of the
likely consequences of that activity, presumably
the evaluation of a reasonable person.
By holding that Henry's rights were violated
because the government had intentionally created
a situation "likely to induce" Henry to make in-
criminating statements, the Court indicated that
the subjective intent of the government agent in
instructing Nichols to report anything he heard
was irrelevant. The Henry test apparently prohibits
the government from engaging in any conduct
which is likely to result in an incriminating re-
sponse from the defendant. This approach appears
to constitute an expansion of recent interpretations
of the right to counsel rule under Massiah.
An expansive reading of Massiah accords with
early opinions advocating the right to counsel rule
later mandated in Massiah. In Spano v. New York,39
four justices in two concurring opinions laid the
groundwork for what was later to become the
Massiah rule.40 Justices Douglas and Stewart wrote
dissenting opinions which advanced the view that
once adversary proceedings have been initiated
against an individual, his right to the assistance of
counsel should attach. The facts of that case were
decidedly more extreme than those of Henry in that
37 Id. at 2200.
as 377 U.S. at 207.
19 3 6 0 U.S. 315 (1959).
4 Id. at 324, 325 (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 326,
327 (Stewart, J., concurring).
a confession was obtained from defendant Spano
after an eight-hour, all-night questioning session
and false pleas from a police officer friend. In Spano,
neither Justice Douglas nor Justice Stewart predi-
cated the attachment of the right to counsel upon
the deliberateness of police interrogation. In fact,
Justice Stewart strongly suggested a per se rule
against the admissibility of any confession obtained
in the absence of counsel from a defendant under
indictment. 41 Thus, the early concept of the Mas-
siah rule was broader than even the Henry test, since
the Spano dissent urged per se exclusion regardless
of whether the government objectively or subjec-
tively sought by its conduct toobtain incriminating
information.
However, in Brewer v. Williams,42 the Court ap-
peared to narrow the scope of the right to counsel
under Massiah by stating that right was violated
only when the government engaged in interroga-
tion. Justice Blackmun relied on this aspect of
Brewer to contend in his Henry dissent that "delib-
erate elicitation" entails purposeful police action.43
In Brewer, the Court found a violation of the de-
fendant's sixth amendment right to the assistance
of counsel when a police detective, in the absence
of Williams' lawyer, "deliberately and designedly
set out to elicit information from Williams just as
surely as-and perhaps more effectively than-if
he had formally i'nterrogated him."
In Brewer, the Court's discussion of the subjective
intentions of the detective was directed at deter-
mining whether the "Christian burial speech
' 45
was tantamount to formal interrogation. The
Brewer Court indicated that the defendant's right
to counsel under Massiah was not violated unless
the police had in fact "interrogated" him.
46
41 Justice Stewart states at the outset that "the absence
of counsel when this confession was elicited was alone
enough to render it inadmissible under the Fourteenth
Amendment." 360 U.S. at 326 (Stewart, J., concurring).
42 430 U.S. 387 (1977).
43 100 S. Ct. at 2191.
4 430 U.S. at 392-93.
45 The "Christian burial speech," as it has been termed,
refers to remarks made by the detective to the defendant
during a lengthy car ride from Davenport, Iowa, where
Williams had turned himself in, back to Des Moines, the
scene of the crime. The officer, who knew that Williams
was a former mental patient and a deeply religious
individual, sought to obtain incriminating statements
from Williams by telling him that the parents of the 10-
year-old girl whom he had abducted were entitled to a
Christian burial for their daughter and that they should
therefore try to locate the body while they were on the
way back to Des Moines. Id. at 392.
6 As the Court stated, "[No such constitutional pro-
[Vol. 71
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This interrogation requirement constituted an
unprecedented and anomalous development in the
sixth amendment right to counsel area.4 7 Nothing
"n the Court's opinion in Massiah indicated that
Massiah had been interrogated, nor that such a
finding was essential in order for his rightto counsel
to attach. A finding that "interrogation" had oc-
curred would of course have been a prerequisite to
a holding that Williams' statements were inadmis-
sible under Miranda v. Arizona, since Williams had
effectively asserted his right to counsel by retaining
attorneys.48 Thus, any further interrogation would
have violated Williams' fifth amendment rights
under Miranda.49
The Brewer Court's emphasis on interrogation in
its Massiah analysis led lower courts to interpret
Brewer as requiring a greater showing of affirmative
action by the government than was originally con-
templated in Massiah. One illustration of such an
interpretation is Wilson v. Henderson,5 in which the
Second Circuit held that incriminating admissions
which a defendant made to his cellmate, who had
previously agreed with the police to act as an
informant, were properly admitted at the defend-
ant's trial. Wilson's cellmate, like Nichols, had been
instructed not to inquire or to question Wilson, but
to "keep his ears open"' for information which
would lead to the apprehension of Wilson's accom-
plices. When Wilson subsequently told the inform-
ant the same story that he had told the authorities,
the informant replied "that the story did not sound
too good.",52 Eventually, however, Wilson confessed
his complicity in the robbery and murder to the
informant.
In holding that the defendant's statements to his
tection would have come into play if there had been no
interrogation." Id. at 400. The Court further stated that
"the clear rule of Massiah is that once adversaty proceed-
ings have commenced against an individual, he has a
right to legal representation when the government inter-
rogates him. Id. at 401 (emphasis added).47 See Kamisar, Brewer v. Williams, Massiah, and Miranda:
What Is Interrogation? When Does It Matter?, 67 GEo. L.J. 1
(1978). Professor Kamisar stated that "the transformation
of Williams from a Miranda case to a Massiah one would
have been a good deal more understandable if the Wil-
liams court found not only 'no need to review the Miranda
doctrine' but no need to consider whether 'the speech'
constituted 'interrogation' either." Id at 32-33 (footnote
omitted).
48 Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. at 405.
49 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 444-45.
5°584 F.2d 1185 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S.
945 (1979).
5 Id at 1187.52 id
cellmate were properly admitted, the court of ap-
peals viewed Brewer as a restrictive interpretation
of Massiah. It framed its analysis in terms of "inter-
rogation," and stated that "[t]he complete absence
of interrogation in this case negates the proposition
that Wilson's statement was deliberately elic-
ited. ' 'ss In light of the Supreme Court's decision in
Henry, however, the lower court's decision may well
have gone the other way.
The Henry Court did not explain the emphasis
which it had placed on interrogation in Brewer;
rather, the Court merely stated that "we are not
persuaded, as the Government contends, that
Brewer v. Williams ... modified Massiah's 'deliber-
ately elicited' test." 54 However, the Henry majority
plainly rejected "interrogation" as a prerequisite
for the attachment of the sixth amendment right
to counsel, since it did not so much as mention
interrogation in its decision. This rejection properly
interprets Massiah since Massiah did not require
interrogation for the right to counsel to attach. The
Court's de-emphasis of interrogation will now in-
dicate to the lower courts that the right to counsel
applies even in the absence of a finding of "inter-
rogation.
' 55
The Court in Henry thus reaffirmed the contin-
uing vitality of Massiah and rejected the restrictive
interpretation cast upon the Massiah rule by
Brewer.56 The Henry Court chose to revitalize Mas-
siah despite the strong dissent ofJustice Rehnquist,
who argued that Massiah itself was "fundamentally
inconsistent with traditional notions of the role of
the attorney that underlie the Sixth Amendment
53Id. at 1190.
54 100 S. Ct. at 2187.
ss Such decisions as United States v. Hearst, 563 F.2d
1331 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1000 (1978),
would probably result differently after Heny. In Hearst
the Court found no violation of appellant's sixth amend-
ment right to the assistance of counsel when a tape
recording of her conversation with a jail visitor was
admitted at trial because "there was no interrogation of
her-either formally or surreptitiously-by the govern-
ment." Id. at 1348.
S judge Oaks, dissenting in Wilson, set forth what may
have been the proper interpretation of the interrogation
language in Brewer.
[T]he Court must be using 'interrogation' to mean
both formal interrogation and 'deliberate elicit-
ing'.... The 'interrogation' language may be ill-
chosen, but the Court's statement that 'the clear
rule of Massiah is that the right to counsel attaches
when the State 'interrogates' could not by any
stretch of the imagination be interpreted as a limi-
tation of Massiah.
584 F.2d at 1194 n. 10 (Oaks, J., dissenting).
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right to counsel. ' s He maintained that the tradi-
tional concerns underlying the right to counsel are
to assist the layman in arguing the law, to aid in
coping with comolex legal procedure, and to min-
imize the imbalance that results when the unaided
defendant is opposed by a trained prosecutor.5
Justice Rehnquist argued that none of these objec-
tives mandated the presence of counsel when
Henry carried on his conversations with Nichols.
In Justice Rehnquist's view, the sixth amendment
does not prohibit the government from making any
effort to obtain incriminating evidence from an
accused when his counsel is not present.5 9
In support of his argument, Justice Rehnquist
cited several cases in which the Court held that the
sixth amendment does not require the presence of
counsel when the government engages in particular
activities. In United States v. Ash,6° the accused was
denied the right to have his counsel present during
a postindictment photographic display which was
conducted in order to allow a witness to identify
the offender. In that case, the Court perceived no
need for the presence of counsel, because "no pos-
sibility arises that the accused might be misled by
his lack of familiarity with the law or overpowered
by his professional adversary."
61
Similarly, in Gilbert v. California62 the Court held
that the taking of a handwriting exemplar in the
absence of the defendant's counsel did not violate
the defendant's rights, since "there is a minimal
risk that the absence of counsel might derogate
from his right to a fair trial."ss
These cases are easily distinguishable from Henry
because the presence of counsel during the govern-
mental activity in both Ash and Gilbert would not
have made any difference in the defendant's con-
duct. The handwriting of the defendant in Gilbert
would be unaffected by the presence or absence of
counsel, as would the ability of the witness in Ash
to identify the offender. In Henry, however, the
presence of counsel would have affected the de-
fendant's behavior during the time that Henry
carried on his conversations with Nichols, since
counsel would certainly have told him to remain
silent. In Henry's case, a distinct possibility did
5' 100 S. Ct. at 2199 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
' United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 307-09 (1973).
59 100 S. Ct. at 2199 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
60413 U.S. 300 (1973).
61 Id. at 317.
2 388 U.S. 263 (1967).
63 Id. at 267. This case did not really involve the
Massiah rule, since the handwriting exemplars referred to
were taken before the defendant's indictment. However,
the Court's reasoning still applies.
exist that he may have been "misled by his lack of
familiarity with the law or overpowered by his
professional adversary.
' ' 4
Thus, Justice Rehnquist's interpretation of the
sixth amendment is too narrow. The Henry Court's
decision to reaffirm Massiah and the right to coun-
sel was consistent with the traditional policies and
concerns of the sixth amendment.
III. APPLICATION OF THE "LIKELY TO INDUCE"
STANDARD
When read in the light of the Court's recent
opinion in Rhode Island v. Innis,65 Henry may also
indicate a willingness by the Court to construe
liberally the "likely to induce" standard under
Massiah in comparison to the narrower construction
of a similar objective standard the Court utilizes to
determine whether governmental conduct violates
Miranda. The Henry Court found that the govern-
ment's use of an undercover cellmate informant
was "likely to induce" Henry's incriminating dis-
closures in violation of his rights under Massiah,
despite the complete lack of any evidentiary in-
quiry into what was said and by whom to indicate
the degree of the government's interference. In
contrast, the Court in Iniis held, under a similar
objective test and in the face of arguably more
elicitous police conduct, that there had been no
violation of the defendant's fifth amendment rights
under Miranda.
Both Innis and Henry promulgated objective tests
to determine whether the government had violated
the respective defendants' rights. The Innis court
interpreted Miranda to require that the government
adhere to the Miranda safeguards, not only when
the suspect is in custody and subjected to express
questioning, but also when the police engage in
any conduct which they "should know [is] reason-
ably likely to elicit an incriminating response from
the suspect. '66 Applying this test to the facts of
Innis, the Court found no violation of the defend-
ant's rights under Miranda since the circumstances
showed that the patrolmen could not have known
that their conversation was reasonably likely to
elicit an incriminating response from Innis.
67
However, the facts of Innis indicate that the
police conduct in that case was more "likely to
elicit" incriminating information than the presence
64413 U.S. at 317.
100 S. Ct. 1682 (1980). See Note, Fi?h Amendment-
The Meaning of Interrogation Under Miranda, 71 J. CRIM. L.
& C. (1980).
ia. at 1689 (footnotes omitted).
6
7 Id. at 1691.
[Vol. 71
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of the informant was "likely to induce" incrimi-
nating statements in Henry. In Innis, a man robbed
and killed a taxicab driver With a shotgun. Police
arrested Innis shortly after another cab driver re-
ported being robbed by a man wielding a sawed-
off shotgun. Innis was placed in a squad car to be
taken to the police station, accompanied by three
patrolmen. On the way to the station, two of the
officers riding with Innis struck up a conversation
concerning the shotgun which'had been used in
the murder. The patrolmen discussed the possibil-
ity that a child from a nearby school for the
handicapped might find the weapon and be hurt.
At this point, Innis interrupted the officers, telling
them to turn the car around so that he could lead
them to the gun. At the time Innis told the officers
to turn the car around, they had traveled no more
than a mile. They subsequently returned to the
scene of the arrest, and the defendant was advised
of his Miranda rights for the fourth time. Innis
replied that he understood his rights, but that he
"'wanted to get the gun out of the way because of
the kids in the area in the school.' "68 Innis then
led the police to the place where he had hidden
the shotgun.
In holding that the police officers' conduct did
not violate Innis' rights under Miranda, the Court
emphasized that there was "nothing in the record
to suggest that the officers were aware that the
respondent was peculiarly susceptible to an appeal
to his conscience concerning the safety of handi-
capped children."' 9 It also noted that there was no
suggestion that the police knew that Innis was
"unusually disoriented or upset" when he was ar-
rested.70 The Court acknowledged that Innis had
been subjected to "'subtle compulsion,' ,7 but
concluded that this was insufficient to constitute a
violation of his rights under Miranda.
The tension between the Court's decision in Innis
and that in Henry is apparent from a comparison of
the two sets of facts and the Court's reasoning in
arriving at the respective conclusions. In both cases,
the Court used a similar objective test to determine
whether the defendant's rights had been violated.
One factor which the Henry Court relied upon to
conclude that Nichols' presence was "likely to in-
duce" Henry's incriminating statements was the
inherent pressures and "subtle influences" of cus-
tody.72 Yet, at the time Henry made his statements
6Id. at 1687.
69Id. at 1690.
"' Id. at 1691.
72 100 S. Ct. at 1692.
to Nichols, he undoubtedly considered himself not
in the presence of coercive government agents, but
in the company of a friend or confidant. On the
other hand, Innis had just been arrested and was
being transported to the police station in the com-
pany of three police officers. It seems clear that of
the two defendants, Innis was under more of the
custodial pressure discussed in Henry.
Moreover, the character of the patrolmen's con-
versation in Innis seems "likely to elicit" an incrim-
inating response from even the most hardened
individuals. As Justice Marshall pointed out in his
Innis dissent: "[o]ne can scarcely imagine a stronger
appeal to the conscience of a suspect-any sus-
pect-than the assertion that if the weapon is not
found an innocent person will be hurt or killed."73
In Henry there was no record of the exact content
of the conversation between Nichols and Henry
which led to Henry's incriminating statements, but
it is improbable that the discussion was more lead-
ing than the one in Innis.
The Innis Court also discussed the absence of any
"peculiar susceptibility" or "unusual disorienta-
tion" on the part of Innis as support for its decision
that the patrolmen's conversation was not "likely
to elicit" a response from him. 74 The Henry decision
contains no mention of any such limiting factors.
A comparison of the two decisions leads to the
conclusion that the Court is willing to apply its
objective test under Massiah so as to find a violation
of the defendant's sixth amendment rights when it
would not find a fifth amendment violation under
the similar objective Miranda test. The Innis Court
did note that Brewer was irrelevant to the decision
in Innis, since Brewer was based upon the sixth
amendment rather than the fifth and since "the
policies underlying the two constitutional protec-
tions are quite distinct." 75 However, the similarity
in the formulation of the two standards calls for
some sort of justification for the disparate appli-
cations of the standards in Henry and Innis. The
Henry Court offered no such explanation. Appar-
ently, the "subtle compulsion" acknowledged in
Innis is less "likely to elicit" an incriminating re-
73 Id. at 1692 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
74 Id. at 1690.
75 Id. at 1689 n.4. The purpose of the fifth amendment
was to prohibit the use of coerced confessions, whereas
the sixth amendment was intended to guarantee the
accused the aid of counsel. Nevertheless, the tests are
phrased in such a similar fashion that analysis of their
application requires some sort of reconciliation between
Henry and Innis beyond a simple statement of the purposes
of the amendments invoked in support of each result.
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sponse under Miranda than a virtual absence of
compulsion in Henry is "likely to induce" an incrim-
inating response under Massiah.
As the comparison of Henry with Innis demon-
strates, an objective standard can be difficult to
apply and can lead to disparate results. The lack
of a record as to what actually transpired between
Henry and Nichols in the cell does not help to
resolve this disparity. As a result, beyond the im-
mediate facts of the case it is difficult to determine
exactly what Henry prohibits. For example, it is
unclear how much weight should be given to each
of the three factors enumerated by the majority,7'
especially the fact that Henry was in custody.
Furthermore, the Court does not clarify whether it
is necessary under the new "likely to induce" test
to find that the undercover informant in fact
"prompted" the defendant to make his incriminat-
ing admissions, and if such prompting did occur,
what constitutes the prohibited degree of affirma-
tive action. For example, the new test does not
indicate whether the mere presence of an informant
cellmate who did not converse with the defendant,
but who overheard incriminating admissions from
the defendant, nevertheless, would violate his right
to counsel.
Justice Blackmun's dissent further illustrates the
potential for confusion inherent in the "likely to
induce" test. In addition to his disagreement with
the substance of the majority's test, Justice Black-
mun argued that the majority misapplied that test
to the facts. Under his interpretation of the facts of
Henry, he concluded that the government's employ-
ment of Nichols to act as an informant was not
likely to induce Henry to incriminate himself, and
further, that Nichols had engaged in no "prompt-
ing" in order to obtain statements from Henry.
Justice Blackmun first noted that the reasonable
conclusion to be drawn from Nichols' contingent
fee arrangement, if indeed such an arrangement
existed," was that Nichols would refrain from ques-
tioning Henry or otherwise initiating conversation
with him for fear of forfeiting his remuneration.
He further stated that the majority wrongly em-
phasized the fact that Henry was unaware that
Nichols was a government agent because the Brewer
Court had stated that whether incriminating state-
ments were obtained directly or surreptitiously was
" 'constitutionally irrelevant.' "78
7
6 See note 15 & accompanying text supra.
77 See note 17 & accompanying text supra.
78 100 S. Ct. at 2194 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing
430 U.S. at 400).
Justice Blackmun also criticized the Court's ap-
plication of the custody factor. He pointed out that
in Henry there was no display whatsoever of gov-
ernmental power which might have overcome
Henry's free will.
Furthermore, Justice Blackmun stated that the
scant record showed only that Nichols and Henry
had engaged in conversations, and not that Nichols
had "stimulated" these remarks in any way, "par-
ticularly whether Nichols subtly or otherwise fo-
cused attention on the bank robberies." 79 He con-
cluded that the Henry majority "disregards prece-
dent and stretches to the breaking point a virtually
silent record. ' ' ss Justice Blackmun's opinion illus-
trates that the Henry test may be susceptible of as
many different applications as there are judges
who attempt to apply it, an obvious problem with
an objective standard.
The difficulty in the application of the Henry test
poses problems not only for the lower courts, but
also for the police and prosecutors who must at-
tempt to abide by the prohibition of the test in
their dealings with defendants. The Henry decision
may lead prosecutors to abandon the use of under-
cover informants, despite the acknowledged value
of undercover work in effective law enforcement.
8
1
In addition, Henry mandates the exclusion of rele-
vant evidence which was unquestionably given
voluntarily.8 2 Nevertheless, as the Spano majority
noted in support of its exclusion of unconstitution-
ally obtained evidence, "the police must obey the
law while enforcing the law; ... in the end life and
liberty can be as much endangered from illegal
methods used to convict those thought to be crim-
inals as from the actual criminals themselves.
'ss
IV. CONCLUSION
Thus, in Henry the Court formulated a new
objective standard to determine whether govern-
mental conduct violates a defendant's sixth amend-
ment right to counsel under Massiah. In so doing,
the Court reaffirmed the vitality of the Massiah
rule and rejected any restrictive reading which
might have been placed on that rule by Brewer.
The test set forth in Henry may result in widely
differing applications as evidenced by the differing
conclusions reached in the two dissenting opinions.
Thus, case-by-case applications in the lower courts
79Id. at 2196 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
80 Id.
8' See Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 557 (1977).
82 See 100 S. Ct. at 2200-01 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
8 360 U.S. at 320-21.
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will be necessary to develop guidelines for when
particular governmental conduct will be held to be
in violation of a defendant's right to counsel.
In addition, a comparison of the application of
the Henry standard with that of the Innis test for
violation of Miranda rights may indicate a renewed
importance of the Massiah doctrine in that the
Court may prove to be more willing to find a
violation of a defendant's rights under the former
than the latter. However, additional decisions of
the Court in this area also will be required in order
to arrive at this conclusion.
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